Viceordförande Julia Sebutinde har avvikande åsikt till ICJ:s rådgivande beslut

 Julia Sebutinde, viceordförande i ICJ, har ännu en gång skrivit en avvikande åsikt till domstolens rådgivande uttalande gällande Israel. Domare Sebutinde är tydligen en kvinna som tänker själv, tar reda på fakta och vågar gå emot den allmänna opinionen, som väldigt långt styrs av hat mot Israel och judar. Därför verkar det också finnas sådana som försöker få henne sparkad från domstolen. Alla borde ju vara mot Israel oberoende av vad fakta säger, verkar det som.

Här följer några plock från hennes text: (Hela texten är 32 sidor, men vill man lära sig nåt måste man ta tid och studera) 

(iii) The question potentially circumvents the existing international negotiation framework, and the principle of State consent to judicial settlement of inter-State disputes 

15. Once again, the United Nations General Assembly has asked the Court to render a one-sided opinion on the legal obligations of one of the parties to the conflict (Israel), thereby shielding the other party to the conflict (Palestine) and its allies from judicial scrutiny of their policies and practices. As I cautioned in my dissenting opinion in 2024, this lopsided approach to the situation “is likely to exacerbate rather than de-escalate tensions in the Middle East”26. Furthermore, by involving once again the principal judicial organ of the United Nations in a lopsided scrutiny of the obligations of Israel, whilst completely ignoring or downplaying its legitimate territorial claims and security concerns or the corresponding obligations of the United Nations and third States operating in the OPT, the Court is not only asked to circumvent the existing international negotiation framework27, but also the principle of State consent as elaborated in my aforesaid dissenting opinion28.

A. Irreconcilable goals and objectives 

19. Both sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain firmly committed to their respective strategic goals and objectives, with little indication of compromise or de-escalation. This entrenched posture has significant legal implications, particularly in relation to the conduct of hostilities, the protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law. On one hand, the publicly articulated objectives of Hamas30 in the context of the Gaza conflict include: (i) the elimination of the State of Israel31; (ii) the establishment in its stead of an Islamic State governed by Sharia law across Gaza, the West Bank and the territory currently comprising Israel; (iii) the pursuit of armed resistance against Israeli occupation; (iv) the retention of political and military control over the Gaza Strip32; and (v) the strategic use of hostages as leverage in negotiations33. 

20. On the other hand, the State of Israel, through official statements by government representatives including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu34, has articulated the following strategic objectives in the context of the Gaza conflict: (i) neutralization of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities  aimed at dismantling Hamas’ operational infrastructure and administrative control in Gaza to prevent future attacks and restore national security; (ii) securing the release and safe recovery of Israeli hostages from Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023; (iii) ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a strategic or security threat to Israeli territory or population; (iv) termination of Hamas’ authority in Gaza and promoting the development of a post-conflict administrative framework, potentially involving international or regional actors; and (v) restoration of Israel’s deterrence posture and reinforcing public confidence in the State’s capacity to defend its citizens against future aggression and cross-border attacks. Israel has consistently emphasized that its military operations are directed against designated terrorist organizations, specifically Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and not against the civilian population of Gaza. This distinction is central to Israel’s stated commitment to compliance with international humanitarian rights law, particularly the principles of distinction and proportionality. 

B. Competing narratives regarding the humanitarian situation in Gaza 

21. While the humanitarian situation in Gaza remains a matter of grave concern, the Court must be mindful of the challenges in verifying the accuracy and authenticity of information presented in these advisory proceedings. This is particularly important given the rapidly evolving conditions on the ground, the absence of independent verification mechanisms and the prevalence of disinformation and systematic propaganda surrounding the conflict. The integrity of the Court’s assessment depends on its ability to distinguish between credible evidence and politically motivated narratives, in accordance with principles of procedural fairness and the objective application of international law. For instance, certain widely circulated images purporting to depict starving children in Gaza have been exposed as misleading or lacking critical context35.

22. Particularly troubling is the documented misuse of photographs of children suffering from pre-existing medical conditions, which were erroneously disseminated by various media outlets as emblematic of famine-related suffering in Gaza36. In one notable case, The New York Times and other major outlets issued corrections after it was revealed that a child portrayed as a victim of starvation was, in fact, afflicted by rare genetic disorders unrelated to malnutrition37. Moreover, senior United Nations officials have, on occasion, retracted or revised public statements after the underlying claims were found to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated38. These incidents underscore the prevalence of disinformation and propaganda in the current hostilities and highlight the need for the Court to exercise rigorous evidentiary scrutiny in assessing claims related to the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip39.

C. The real questions the Court and the international community should address

28. Although the General Assembly in resolution 79/232 expresses “deep concern at measures taken by Israel that impede assistance to the Palestinian people, including through measures that affect the presence, activities and immunities of the United Nations, its agencies and bodies, and those of other international organizations, and the representation of third States in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, the evidence before the Court indicates that this concern primarily relates to Israel’s cessation of co-operation with a single United Nations agency  the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accordingly, this separate opinion will focus on examining the legal relationship between the host State of Israel and UNRWA, with particular focus on whether Israel’s 2024 decision to terminate co-operation with the Agency was consistent with its obligations under international law.

29. What then are the real questions that the Court and international community should be concerned with? In addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, it is imperative that the international community clearly identify and confront the root causes of the bottlenecks obstructing the delivery of life-saving aid  particularly those arising within the Gaza Strip itself  and work collectively to develop practical and effective solutions. This urgency is underscored by credible, well-documented reports from United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations and journalists on the ground, which indicate that trucks carrying substantial quantities of humanitarian supplies remain stalled at Gaza’s borders due to the absence of functioning distribution mechanisms or to the poor state of the infrastructure required to ensure aid reaches the civilian population.

30. Admittedly, the resolution of these operational challenges lies beyond the scope of the present advisory proceedings, which are confined to examining the legal obligations of Israel as the host State. In my respectful view, the Court is not the appropriate forum to propose or assess logistical or policy responses to the broader humanitarian crisis. That responsibility rests squarely with the international community, which must act with urgency, co-ordination, and resolve to address the situation effectively.

A. Interpretation and scope of the question

 34. Thirdly, the framing of the question appears to single out Israel as the sole belligerent in the Gaza conflict, despite the broader context involving Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other third States. This framing suggests a presumption that Israel alone bears responsibility for the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, which risks overlooking both Israel’s legitimate security concerns and the contributions of other actors  including armed groups and third States  to the crisis affecting the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In my view, this imbalance should be addressed by recognizing the complex and evolving nature of the conflict, which continues to unfold in the wake of the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas. I aim to do so in this separate opinion.

B. United Nations bodies and agencies operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

39. These United Nations agencies play a crucial role in the OPT by providing essential services such as education, healthcare, social support and humanitarian aid, to Palestinian refugees, as well as advocating for human rights and supporting development. Until recently, these United Nations agencies (apart from UNRWA) have successfully fulfilled their mandates in the OPT, benefiting from the relevant immunities and privileges, albeit within the constraints imposed by the ongoing armed conflict.

C. States and organizations involved in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

42. Israel has justified its military operations in the OPT  including restrictions on access of aid to the Gaza Strip at various points in the conflict  primarily on security grounds, citing the need to neutralize threats posed by the Hamas administration, including alleged infiltration of UNRWA. It asserts that its campaign is aimed at protecting Israeli citizens, securing the release of hostages and preventing future attacks, including rocket fire and cross-border incursions. From Israel’s perspective, these operations are essential to dismantling Hamas’ infrastructure and ensuring national security, notwithstanding the significant humanitarian concerns and mounting international pressure for a ceasefire. According to Israel, the restrictions it placed on aid access between 2 March 2025 and 19 May 2025 were aimed at pressuring Hamas into accepting a proposed extension of the ceasefire, including the release of the remaining Israeli hostages then held by Hamas. 

D. The unique status and role of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

45. The mandate of UNRWA was subsequently expanded to cover all those displaced because of that war, and has been regularly renewed by the General Assembly, most recently on 12 December 2022, when the General Assembly extended the mandate of the Agency until 30 June 2026. Until the recent Israeli legislation affecting its operations, UNRWA has operated in the OPT from a West Bank Field Office located in East Jerusalem and a Gaza Field Office in the Gaza Strip. According to the United Nations Secretary-General, UNRWA provided and operated a significant part of the Palestinian health and educational infrastructure, especially in Gaza, including approximately 400 schools, 65 primary health clinics and one hospital, educating approximately 350,000 students and facilitating millions of healthcare consultations annually, as part of its operations. UNRWA has more than 17,000 personnel, comprising a small number of internationally recruited staff, and a much larger number of locally recruited staff, of which more than a third operate in the Gaza Strip.

E. The legal framework governing the relationship between UNRWA and Israel and the lawfulness of Israel’s termination of co-operation

46. The majority opines that Israel owes certain obligations in relation to the operation of the United Nations, including the obligation not to “obstruct the functions of the United Nations”; to “provide every assistance in any action taken by the Organization in accordance with the Charter in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory”; and to “ensure full respect for the privileges and immunities accorded to the United Nations, including its entities and personnel, and to refrain from any interference with the performance of their functions” 58. The majority derives these obligations from the United Nations Charter and the 1946 Convention. I respectfully disagree with the Court’s framing and understanding of these obligations, particularly in relation to UNRWA. As previously noted, the applicable legal framework is more nuanced. The scope of the protections afforded under these instruments is not absolute and is often qualified by specific agreements concluded between United Nations agencies and host States. In the present case, the host State of Israel concluded a bilateral agreement with UNRWA in 1967, as elaborated below.

(i) The “Comay-Michelmore Agreement of 14 June 1967” and the 1946 Convention 47. 

On 14 June 1967, following the Six-Day War after which the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem came under Israeli control, Israel and UNRWA concluded an “Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Concerning Assistance to Palestine Refugees” 59 (also known as the “Comay-Michelmore Agreement of 14 June 1967” 60).

48. It is profoundly regrettable that, in its extensive analysis of Israel’s obligations to co-operate with the United Nations (in particular, UNRWA) and to respect the privileges and immunities of the Organization and its personnel61, the majority disregards the Comay-Michelmore Agreement and its legal significance in defining Israel’s relationship with UNRWA. This omission is glaring and leads to the erroneous conclusion that the privileges and immunities previously accorded to UNRWA in the host State derived not from their incorporation under that bilateral agreement, but rather directly from the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations62. The Court’s approach effectively erases a foundational instrument governing the relationship between Israel and UNRWA, reducing the legal framework to just the United Nations Charter and the 1946 Convention. Such narrow and selective reading undermines the integrity of the Court’s analysis and raises serious concerns about the completeness and credibility of its reasoning. In this separate opinion, I attempt to explore a more balanced analysis of the legal framework governing the relationship between UNRWA and the host State of Israel, including this foundational instrument.

50. The text of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement clearly reflects the mutual intent of the parties and contains several explicit and implicit limitations on the scope of co-operation. First, the designation of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement as “provisional” and subject to replacement or cancellation underscores its lack of permanence and legal certainty, allowing for unilateral termination. Second, Israel’s co-operation is based on its consent to the presence of UNRWA on   Israeli territory and is expressly conditioned on “regulations or arrangements necessitated by considerations of military security”, granting Israel broad discretion to restrict UNRWA’s operations based on its security assessments. Third, the free movement of UNRWA personnel is contingent on security arrangements with Israeli military authorities, placing operational logistics under military control and potentially subjecting humanitarian activities to delay or obstruction.

52. The 1946 Convention affirms the principle of functional necessity, permitting limitations only under specific circumstances  such as access restrictions due to armed conflict, suspension of operations in response to credible terrorist threats, or termination of co-operation based on verified evidence of a United Nations agency’s involvement in harbouring individuals engaged in terrorism. In this regard, Israel’s termination of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement  if based on credible and verifiable evidence backing its security concerns  may constitute a lawful restriction. The Court’s failure to engage substantively with this issue represents a significant omission in its legal analysis. While such limitations are not inherently unlawful, their validity depends on whether they satisfy the criteria of necessity, proportionality and compatibility with the United Nations’ ability to carry out its mandate. Measures that fall short of these standards may be deemed inconsistent with a Member State’s obligations under the United Nations Charter and the 1946 Convention. 

53. Israel asserts that the measures it has adopted in relation to UNRWA  including the cessation of UNRWA’s operations within Israeli territory and the termination of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement  are consistent with international law and meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality. Regarding necessity, Israel asserts that its measures are aimed at safeguarding Israel’s national security and the safety of its citizens, particularly in light of the 7 October 2023 attacks and subsequent threats by terrorist groups including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It further asserts that the measures are considered necessary, as no less restrictive alternatives are available that would adequately ensure Israel’s security or protect its population from ongoing terrorist threats. 

54. Second, Israel contends that the measures taken strike a fair balance between its security imperatives and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian population in the OPT. Notably, Israel has stated that its measures do not impede the operations of other United Nations agencies, international organizations or third States that continue to provide essential humanitarian aid, basic services and development assistance to the Palestinian civilian population. The assertions advanced by Israel about the effect of its legislation have not been challenged in these proceedings. This uncontroverted record strongly supports the conclusion that Israel acted within the permissible limitations established under the applicable legal framework, and that its enactment of the two Israeli Parliament (Knesset) laws resulting in the unilateral termination of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement is consistent with international law.

(iii) UNRWA’s presence and activities on Israeli territory are subject to the consent of the host State.

61. So long as Israel continues to ensure the provision of essential humanitarian aid and basic services to the Palestinian population through alternative channels  as it has consistently done throughout the ongoing military operation in the Gaza Strip  its decision to prohibit UNRWA’s operations and presence within its territory falls squarely within its sovereign rights. The exercise of such sovereignty, particularly in the context of national security and public order, is recognized under international law and cannot be deemed unlawful merely because it affects a United Nations agency. Just as Caesar’s wife must be above reproach, UNRWA  and any humanitarian organization operating in or in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory  must adhere to the highest standards of neutrality and impartiality. Only under such conditions can a host State be reasonably expected to extend the privileges and immunities afforded under the applicable legal framework. The integrity of these protections depends fundamentally on the perceived and actual neutrality of the organization in question.

(iv) Israel has competing international obligations to combat acts of terrorism on its territory:

62. Israel is subject to multiple, and at times competing, international obligations  including its duty to combat acts of terrorism within its territory. These obligations arise not only under international counter-terrorism conventions but also from binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. In fulfilling these obligations, Israel is required to take effective measures to prevent, suppress and respond to terrorist activity, even where such measures may intersect with its responsibilities under other international legal frameworks. Those obligations require it to prevent any organization, including UNRWA and its staff, from engaging in or facilitating terrorist activities on its territory. Israel is party to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, alongside 169 other States. Article 15 (a) of the Convention obliges States parties to take all practicable measures  including, where necessary, adapting their domestic legislation  to  prevent and counter preparations for the commission of offences defined in Article 2, whether within or outside their territories. These measures include prohibiting illegal activities by individuals, groups or organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or engage in such offences.

65. Israel is also bound by a series of binding Security Council resolutions that require all Member States to take effective measures to combat terrorism and its financing70. Accordingly, where credible information exists indicating that UNRWA premises and facilities are being used for terrorist activity; that UNRWA personnel are participating in such activity; or that terrorist organizations have infiltrated the agency, Israel is not only entitled but obligated under international counter-terrorism conventions and binding Security Council resolutions to take appropriate action. This includes the right to prohibit UNRWA’s continued operations within its territory, consistent with its sovereign duty to prevent and suppress terrorism.

  68. Humanitarian organizations operating in occupied or conflict-affected territories must meet strict criteria of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Where an organization fails to meet these standards, the occupying Power or party to the conflict retains the right to deny or restrict access, provided such measures are grounded in legitimate security concerns. This principle applies not only to occupied territories but also to other areas under a State’s control. Article 70 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions extends this framework to territories under the control of a party to the conflict “other than occupied territory”, requiring that humanitarian and impartial relief actions be permitted “without any adverse distinction”.

70. Considering Israel’s credible allegations outlined in this separate opinion, its decision to restrict UNRWA’s presence and operations on its territory for reasons of national security is clearly justified under international humanitarian law. This is particularly so, given that Israel continues to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and essential services to the civilian population through alternative channels, including capable international organizations and third States. International law does not impose an obligation on Israel to discharge its humanitarian responsibilities exclusively through UNRWA. The choice of implementing partners remains within the discretion of the State, provided humanitarian needs are adequately met.

 72. There is no requirement under international law that such assistance be provided through UNRWA, nor that UNRWA be the exclusive conduit. Israel, along with donor States such as Italy, has expressed a preference for alternative mechanisms, including the WFP, which are capable of delivering aid effectively and in accordance with humanitarian principles.

F. Israel’s security concerns that led to its withdrawal of co-operation with UNRWA

73. Israel’s national security concerns, which prompted its withdrawal of co-operation with UNRWA, constitute a legitimate basis for its actions under international law. Where credible allegations exist regarding the infiltration of UNRWA by terrorist organizations, the misuse of its facilities or the involvement of its personnel in activities that threaten Israel’s sovereignty and security, the host State is entitled  and indeed obligated  to take protective measures. Contrary to the majority views expressed in paragraphs 88 to 101 of the present Advisory Opinion, such concerns fall squarely within the scope of permissible grounds for restricting the presence and operations of international organizations on sovereign territory, under Article 59 of the Fourt Geneva Convention.

 74. Israel, as a host State, has since 1967 co-operated with UNRWA in accordance with its undertakings outlined in the Comay-Michelmore Agreement. However, the Israeli Government has, over the last two decades, raised security concerns with the United Nations regarding what it sees as UNRWA’s increasingly irreparable compromise and violation of the fundamental principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence in the discharge of its humanitarian mandate, including through infiltration of the organization by members of terrorist groups hostile to Israel, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Several participants in these proceedings placed significant emphasis on these security concerns as a justification for Israel’s conduct, arguing that the obligation to co-operate with the United Nations or its agencies is neither absolute nor unqualified76. 

75. In its Written Statement, Israel maintains that UNRWA’s ties to terrorist organizations have long been documented, but scrutiny intensified following allegations that at least 12 UNRWA staff members actively participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad on Israeli territory. These allegations, supported by Israeli intelligence and later investigated by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), led to the termination of contracts of nine staff members whose involvement “could not be ruled out”. In response, several donor States  including the United States, United Kingdom, and others  suspended funding to UNRWA. 

76. Further claims by Israeli officials suggest that UNRWA facilities, including schools, have been used by Hamas and Islamic Jihad for storing weapons and launching attacks, raising concerns about the Agency’s operational neutrality and complicity. Israel has argued that these developments undermine UNRWA’s legitimacy and justify legislative and operational measures to prohibit its activities within Israeli territory

77. Examples of security concerns raised by Israel and supported, amongst others, by the United States of America, include the following:

- In November 2003, Israel submitted a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations alleging that terrorist organizations were exploiting UNRWA facilities in Ramallah, Qalqilya, Jebalia and other refugee camps as hideouts and places of refuge. According to the letter, this misuse posed a serious threat to the safety of individuals who genuinely relied on UNRWA’s humanitarian services. Israel further claimed that violent activities were occurring within UNRWA-administered camps, in violation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The letter also accused specific UNRWA staff members of misusing agency documents, vehicles and facilities to support terrorist organizations. Additionally, Israel expressed concern over inflammatory rhetoric and politically charged articles published by the UNRWA Commissioner-General and UNRWA schools, which it viewed not only as being hostile toward the State of Israel, but as also “undermining the structures established by the United Nations for the expression of opinions on specific situations” and as “undermin[ing] the Organization’s own credibility and standing”78.  

-On 8 November 2005, Israel reported to the Chairman of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) that a rocket-propelled grenade was launched on 30 September 2004 from within the premises of the UNRWA Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys School in Gaza targeting the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)79; 

-  In June 2017, Israel sent letters to the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council calling upon the United Nations to investigate “the existence of a Hamas-built tunnel underneath UNRWA-run Maghazi Elementary Boys A & B School and the Maghazi Preparatory Boys School, in Gaza”, a development Israel asserted was “not an isolated incident” and evidenced Hama’s military build-up and use of children in military campaigns as “human shields”. Israel called upon the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chair of the Security Council to investigate UNRWA’s misinformation campaign against Israel conducted in the OPT including in its schools80.

 - In mid-2017, Israel complained to the United Nations regarding the fact that several UNRWA personnel were either members of Hamas or had strong connections to Hamas, thereby calling into question the political neutrality of the agency. Israel specifically noted the example of two UNRWA staff members, including the Chairman of the UNRWA Staff Union in Gaza, whom it alleged were elected to the political bureau of Hamas81; 

- Israel asserts that in 2023 it found evidence of direct participation by UNRWA staff in the armed attack and atrocities perpetrated on 7 October of that year, including in abductions, murders and illegal detention of Israeli citizens, as well as further evidence of systematic infiltration of UNRWA by Hamas members82. 

- In February 2024 Israel provided specific information on the participation of 12 UNRWA staff members in the attack and atrocities of 7 October 2023 and indicated, based on its intelligence, that another 30 UNRWA staff assisted or facilitated those crimes. According to Israel, a comparison of the list of 12,521 UNRWA employees in Gaza during 2023-2024 (provided to Israel by UNRWA in accordance with procedures established under the 1946 Convention), at least 1,462 of those employees (i.e. 12 per cent) are members of Hamas, its military wing, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or other factions, groups Israel considers to be terrorist organizations. Of these persons, 79 per cent are employed as “educators” and 5 per cent as “medical service providers”. Israel also identified more than 10 per cent of top staff of UNRWA schools and training centres who were members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Israel’s written submission includes examples of specific UNRWA staff members whom Israel alleges worked for Palestinian terrorist groups and participated in the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on the State of Israel. Israel asserts that it has complained about specific UNRWA employees involved in the military activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, without an appropriate response from UNRWA.

- Israel further asserts that during the armed hostilities following the 7 October 2023 attack, there was widespread and systematic misuse of UNRWA assets and facilities, which went largely unchecked. This, Israel claims, underscores the deeply entrenched ties between Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to Israeli sources, Hamas command-and-control centres, weapons caches and hideouts were discovered within, or adjacent to, at least 32 UNRWA facilities  including schools, warehouses, compounds and residential buildings. Most notably, a central server farm located 18 meters underground, allegedly serving as Hamas’ intelligence command centre, was found beneath UNRWA’s Gaza Headquarters and directly connected to its electricity supply. Further, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives and infrastructure were reportedly present inside the UNRWA Headquarters in Gaza City. Multiple attacks against Israel are said to have been launched from within UNRWA premises.

G. Israel’s security concerns warrant thorough investigation and resolution by competent authorities

79. In 2021, the European Parliament voiced its disappointment over the content of certain textbooks and educational materials used in UNRWA schools. It strongly condemned what it described as “problematic and hateful content that promotes violence, spreads antisemitism, and incites hatred”, found in Palestinian school textbooks prepared by European Union-funded civil servants, as well as in supplementary materials developed and taught by UNRWA staff. The European Union expressed regret that UNRWA had failed to remove these materials from circulation85.

81. In addition, the United Nations commenced two separate investigations. The first has been referred to as the “Colonna investigation”, headed by Catherine Colonna, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs. This investigation was tasked with assessing “whether UNRWA’s mechanisms and procedures ensure neutrality”, but not to make any findings regarding the alleged breaches of neutrality specified by Israel87. The Colonna investigation found that despite the “robust UNRWA Neutrality Framework established in 2017”, neutrality-related issues persist. They include instances of staff publicly expressing political views; host-country textbooks with problematic content being used in some UNRWA schools; and politicized staff unions making threats against UNRWA management and causing operational disruptions. In particular, it confirmed that UNRWA’s staff screening mechanisms are inadequate to prevent the employment of terrorists and that periodic inspections of UNRWA’s installations do not investigate misuse for terrorist purposes.