IAEA:s senaste rapport om Irans kärnprogram

Här kan man läsa IAEA:s senaste rapport om Iran från den 24 februari:
Implementation of the NPT SafeguardsAgreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Kort kan man säga att oron för att Iran utvecklar kärnvapen kvarstår.
Iran vägrar ge IAEA den information de vill ha.
Iran vägrar ge IAEA tillstånd att granska vissa anläggningar

Eftersom Iran undertecknat ickespridningsavtalet för kärnvapen är landet skyldigt att samarbeta med IAEA och ge dem uppgifterna de vill ha.
När Iran bryter mot avtalet och inte samarbetar med IAEA kan det knappast tolkas på annat sätt än att Iran har något att dölja; utvecklandet av kärnvapen.

Summary
50. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear
facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude
that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.46
51. The Agency continues to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, as explained in GOV/2011/65. Iran did not provide access to Parchin, as requested by the Agency during its two recent visits to Tehran, and no agreement was reached with Iran on a structured approach to resolving all outstanding issues in connection with Iran’s nuclear programme.
52. Since the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65), contrary to the relevant
resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran continues to carry out uranium enrichment activities and has: increased the number of cascades being used to produce UF6 enriched to 5% U-235; increased the number of cascades being used to produce UF6 enriched to 20% U-235; and is preparing additional cascades at Fordow (FFEP) and Natanz (FEP). Iran has also announced its intention to install three new types of centrifuge at Natanz (PFEP) for R&D purposes.
53. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and
mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards
Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol;
implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards
Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; and suspension of heavy water related activities.
54. The Director General calls upon Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency. The Director General urges
Iran to work with the Agency to reach agreement on a structured approach, based on Agency verification
practices, to resolve all outstanding issues. In particular, the Director General urges Iran to address the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including, as a first step, by responding to the Agency’s questions related to Parchin and the foreign expert, and by granting early access in that regard.
55. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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