Julia Sebutinde, viceordförande i ICJ, har ännu en gång skrivit en avvikande åsikt till domstolens rådgivande uttalande gällande Israel. Domare Sebutinde är tydligen en kvinna som tänker själv, tar reda på fakta och vågar gå emot den allmänna opinionen, som väldigt långt styrs av hat mot Israel och judar. Därför verkar det också finnas sådana som försöker få henne sparkad från domstolen. Alla borde ju vara mot Israel oberoende av vad fakta säger, verkar det som.
Här följer några plock från hennes text: (Hela texten är 32 sidor, men vill man lära sig nåt måste man ta tid och studera)
(iii) The question potentially circumvents the existing international negotiation framework,
and the principle of State consent to judicial settlement of inter-State disputes
15. Once again, the United Nations General Assembly has asked the Court to render a
one-sided opinion on the legal obligations of one of the parties to the conflict (Israel), thereby
shielding the other party to the conflict (Palestine) and its allies from judicial scrutiny of their policies
and practices. As I cautioned in my dissenting opinion in 2024, this lopsided approach to the situation
“is likely to exacerbate rather than de-escalate tensions in the Middle East”26. Furthermore, by
involving once again the principal judicial organ of the United Nations in a lopsided scrutiny of the
obligations of Israel, whilst completely ignoring or downplaying its legitimate territorial claims and
security concerns or the corresponding obligations of the United Nations and third States operating
in the OPT, the Court is not only asked to circumvent the existing international negotiation
framework27, but also the principle of State consent as elaborated in my aforesaid dissenting
opinion28.
A. Irreconcilable goals and objectives
19. Both sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain firmly committed to their respective
strategic goals and objectives, with little indication of compromise or de-escalation. This entrenched
posture has significant legal implications, particularly in relation to the conduct of hostilities, the
protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law. On one hand, the publicly
articulated objectives of Hamas30 in the context of the Gaza conflict include: (i) the elimination of
the State of Israel31; (ii) the establishment in its stead of an Islamic State governed by Sharia law
across Gaza, the West Bank and the territory currently comprising Israel; (iii) the pursuit of armed
resistance against Israeli occupation; (iv) the retention of political and military control over the Gaza
Strip32; and (v) the strategic use of hostages as leverage in negotiations33.
20. On the other hand, the State of Israel, through official statements by government
representatives including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu34, has articulated the following
strategic objectives in the context of the Gaza conflict: (i) neutralization of Hamas’ military and
governance capabilities aimed at dismantling Hamas’ operational infrastructure and
administrative control in Gaza to prevent future attacks and restore national security; (ii) securing
the release and safe recovery of Israeli hostages from Gaza following the events of 7 October 2023;
(iii) ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a strategic or security threat to Israeli territory or population;
(iv) termination of Hamas’ authority in Gaza and promoting the development of a post-conflict
administrative framework, potentially involving international or regional actors; and (v) restoration
of Israel’s deterrence posture and reinforcing public confidence in the State’s capacity to defend its
citizens against future aggression and cross-border attacks. Israel has consistently emphasized that
its military operations are directed against designated terrorist organizations, specifically Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and not against the civilian population of Gaza. This distinction is central
to Israel’s stated commitment to compliance with international humanitarian rights law, particularly
the principles of distinction and proportionality.
B. Competing narratives regarding the humanitarian situation in Gaza
21. While the humanitarian situation in Gaza remains a matter of grave concern, the Court
must be mindful of the challenges in verifying the accuracy and authenticity of information presented
in these advisory proceedings. This is particularly important given the rapidly evolving conditions
on the ground, the absence of independent verification mechanisms and the prevalence of
disinformation and systematic propaganda surrounding the conflict. The integrity of the Court’s
assessment depends on its ability to distinguish between credible evidence and politically motivated narratives, in accordance with principles of procedural fairness and the objective application of
international law. For instance, certain widely circulated images purporting to depict starving
children in Gaza have been exposed as misleading or lacking critical context35.
22. Particularly troubling is the documented misuse of photographs of children suffering from
pre-existing medical conditions, which were erroneously disseminated by various media outlets as
emblematic of famine-related suffering in Gaza36. In one notable case, The New York Times and other
major outlets issued corrections after it was revealed that a child portrayed as a victim of starvation
was, in fact, afflicted by rare genetic disorders unrelated to malnutrition37. Moreover, senior
United Nations officials have, on occasion, retracted or revised public statements after the underlying
claims were found to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated38. These incidents underscore the prevalence
of disinformation and propaganda in the current hostilities and highlight the need for the Court to
exercise rigorous evidentiary scrutiny in assessing claims related to the humanitarian situation in the
Gaza Strip39.
C. The real questions the Court and the international community should address
28. Although the General Assembly in resolution 79/232 expresses “deep concern at measures
taken by Israel that impede assistance to the Palestinian people, including through measures that
affect the presence, activities and immunities of the United Nations, its agencies and bodies, and
those of other international organizations, and the representation of third States in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory”, the evidence before the Court indicates that this concern primarily relates to
Israel’s cessation of co-operation with a single United Nations agency the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accordingly, this separate opinion will
focus on examining the legal relationship between the host State of Israel and UNRWA, with
particular focus on whether Israel’s 2024 decision to terminate co-operation with the Agency was
consistent with its obligations under international law.
29. What then are the real questions that the Court and international community should be
concerned with? In addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, it is imperative that the international
community clearly identify and confront the root causes of the bottlenecks obstructing the delivery
of life-saving aid particularly those arising within the Gaza Strip itself and work collectively to develop practical and effective solutions. This urgency is underscored by credible,
well-documented reports from United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations and journalists
on the ground, which indicate that trucks carrying substantial quantities of humanitarian supplies
remain stalled at Gaza’s borders due to the absence of functioning distribution mechanisms or to the
poor state of the infrastructure required to ensure aid reaches the civilian population.
30. Admittedly, the resolution of these operational challenges lies beyond the scope of the
present advisory proceedings, which are confined to examining the legal obligations of Israel as the
host State. In my respectful view, the Court is not the appropriate forum to propose or assess logistical
or policy responses to the broader humanitarian crisis. That responsibility rests squarely with the
international community, which must act with urgency, co-ordination, and resolve to address the
situation effectively.
A. Interpretation and scope of the question
34. Thirdly, the framing of the question appears to single out Israel as the sole belligerent in
the Gaza conflict, despite the broader context involving Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other third States.
This framing suggests a presumption that Israel alone bears responsibility for the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Gaza, which risks overlooking both Israel’s legitimate security concerns
and the contributions of other actors including armed groups and third States to the crisis
affecting the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In my view, this imbalance should be addressed by
recognizing the complex and evolving nature of the conflict, which continues to unfold in the wake
of the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas. I aim to do so in this separate opinion.
B. United Nations bodies and agencies operating in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory
39. These United Nations agencies play a crucial role in the OPT by providing essential
services such as education, healthcare, social support and humanitarian aid, to Palestinian refugees,
as well as advocating for human rights and supporting development. Until recently, these
United Nations agencies (apart from UNRWA) have successfully fulfilled their mandates in the OPT,
benefiting from the relevant immunities and privileges, albeit within the constraints imposed by the
ongoing armed conflict.
C. States and organizations involved in the provision of humanitarian and
development assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
42. Israel has justified its military operations in the OPT including restrictions on access of
aid to the Gaza Strip at various points in the conflict primarily on security grounds, citing the need
to neutralize threats posed by the Hamas administration, including alleged infiltration of UNRWA.
It asserts that its campaign is aimed at protecting Israeli citizens, securing the release of hostages and
preventing future attacks, including rocket fire and cross-border incursions. From Israel’s
perspective, these operations are essential to dismantling Hamas’ infrastructure and ensuring national
security, notwithstanding the significant humanitarian concerns and mounting international pressure
for a ceasefire. According to Israel, the restrictions it placed on aid access between 2 March 2025
and 19 May 2025 were aimed at pressuring Hamas into accepting a proposed extension of the
ceasefire, including the release of the remaining Israeli hostages then held by Hamas.
D. The unique status and role of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
45. The mandate of UNRWA was subsequently expanded to cover all those displaced because
of that war, and has been regularly renewed by the General Assembly, most recently on 12 December
2022, when the General Assembly extended the mandate of the Agency until 30 June 2026. Until the
recent Israeli legislation affecting its operations, UNRWA has operated in the OPT from a West Bank
Field Office located in East Jerusalem and a Gaza Field Office in the Gaza Strip. According to the
United Nations Secretary-General, UNRWA provided and operated a significant part of the
Palestinian health and educational infrastructure, especially in Gaza, including approximately
400 schools, 65 primary health clinics and one hospital, educating approximately 350,000 students
and facilitating millions of healthcare consultations annually, as part of its operations. UNRWA has
more than 17,000 personnel, comprising a small number of internationally recruited staff, and a much
larger number of locally recruited staff, of which more than a third operate in the Gaza Strip.
E. The legal framework governing the relationship between UNRWA and Israel
and the lawfulness of Israel’s termination of co-operation
46. The majority opines that Israel owes certain obligations in relation to the operation of the
United Nations, including the obligation not to “obstruct the functions of the United Nations”; to
“provide every assistance in any action taken by the Organization in accordance with the Charter in
and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory”; and to “ensure full respect for the privileges
and immunities accorded to the United Nations, including its entities and personnel, and to refrain
from any interference with the performance of their functions” 58. The majority derives these
obligations from the United Nations Charter and the 1946 Convention. I respectfully disagree with
the Court’s framing and understanding of these obligations, particularly in relation to UNRWA. As
previously noted, the applicable legal framework is more nuanced. The scope of the protections
afforded under these instruments is not absolute and is often qualified by specific agreements concluded between United Nations agencies and host States. In the present case, the host State of
Israel concluded a bilateral agreement with UNRWA in 1967, as elaborated below.
(i) The “Comay-Michelmore Agreement of 14 June 1967” and the 1946 Convention
47.
On 14 June 1967, following the Six-Day War after which the West Bank, the Gaza Strip,
and East Jerusalem came under Israeli control, Israel and UNRWA concluded an “Exchange of
Letters Constituting an Agreement Concerning Assistance to Palestine Refugees” 59 (also known as
the “Comay-Michelmore Agreement of 14 June 1967” 60).
48. It is profoundly regrettable that, in its extensive analysis of Israel’s obligations to
co-operate with the United Nations (in particular, UNRWA) and to respect the privileges and
immunities of the Organization and its personnel61, the majority disregards the Comay-Michelmore
Agreement and its legal significance in defining Israel’s relationship with UNRWA. This omission
is glaring and leads to the erroneous conclusion that the privileges and immunities previously
accorded to UNRWA in the host State derived not from their incorporation under that bilateral
agreement, but rather directly from the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations62. The Court’s approach effectively erases a foundational instrument governing the
relationship between Israel and UNRWA, reducing the legal framework to just the United Nations
Charter and the 1946 Convention. Such narrow and selective reading undermines the integrity of the
Court’s analysis and raises serious concerns about the completeness and credibility of its reasoning.
In this separate opinion, I attempt to explore a more balanced analysis of the legal framework
governing the relationship between UNRWA and the host State of Israel, including this foundational
instrument.
50. The text of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement clearly reflects the mutual intent of the
parties and contains several explicit and implicit limitations on the scope of co-operation. First, the
designation of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement as “provisional” and subject to replacement or
cancellation underscores its lack of permanence and legal certainty, allowing for unilateral
termination. Second, Israel’s co-operation is based on its consent to the presence of UNRWA on Israeli territory and is expressly conditioned on “regulations or arrangements necessitated by
considerations of military security”, granting Israel broad discretion to restrict UNRWA’s operations
based on its security assessments. Third, the free movement of UNRWA personnel is contingent on
security arrangements with Israeli military authorities, placing operational logistics under military
control and potentially subjecting humanitarian activities to delay or obstruction.
52. The 1946 Convention affirms the principle of functional necessity, permitting limitations
only under specific circumstances such as access restrictions due to armed conflict, suspension of
operations in response to credible terrorist threats, or termination of co-operation based on verified
evidence of a United Nations agency’s involvement in harbouring individuals engaged in terrorism.
In this regard, Israel’s termination of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement if based on credible and
verifiable evidence backing its security concerns may constitute a lawful restriction. The Court’s
failure to engage substantively with this issue represents a significant omission in its legal analysis.
While such limitations are not inherently unlawful, their validity depends on whether they satisfy the
criteria of necessity, proportionality and compatibility with the United Nations’ ability to carry out
its mandate. Measures that fall short of these standards may be deemed inconsistent with a Member
State’s obligations under the United Nations Charter and the 1946 Convention.
53. Israel asserts that the measures it has adopted in relation to UNRWA including the
cessation of UNRWA’s operations within Israeli territory and the termination of the
Comay-Michelmore Agreement are consistent with international law and meet the criteria of
necessity and proportionality. Regarding necessity, Israel asserts that its measures are aimed at
safeguarding Israel’s national security and the safety of its citizens, particularly in light of the
7 October 2023 attacks and subsequent threats by terrorist groups including Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
It further asserts that the measures are considered necessary, as no less restrictive alternatives are
available that would adequately ensure Israel’s security or protect its population from ongoing
terrorist threats.
54. Second, Israel contends that the measures taken strike a fair balance between its security
imperatives and the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian population in the OPT. Notably, Israel has
stated that its measures do not impede the operations of other United Nations agencies, international
organizations or third States that continue to provide essential humanitarian aid, basic services and
development assistance to the Palestinian civilian population. The assertions advanced by Israel
about the effect of its legislation have not been challenged in these proceedings. This uncontroverted
record strongly supports the conclusion that Israel acted within the permissible limitations
established under the applicable legal framework, and that its enactment of the two Israeli Parliament
(Knesset) laws resulting in the unilateral termination of the Comay-Michelmore Agreement is
consistent with international law.
(iii) UNRWA’s presence and activities on Israeli territory are subject to the consent of the host
State.
61. So long as Israel continues to ensure the provision of essential humanitarian aid and basic
services to the Palestinian population through alternative channels as it has consistently done
throughout the ongoing military operation in the Gaza Strip its decision to prohibit UNRWA’s
operations and presence within its territory falls squarely within its sovereign rights. The exercise of
such sovereignty, particularly in the context of national security and public order, is recognized under
international law and cannot be deemed unlawful merely because it affects a United Nations agency.
Just as Caesar’s wife must be above reproach, UNRWA and any humanitarian organization
operating in or in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory must adhere to the highest
standards of neutrality and impartiality. Only under such conditions can a host State be reasonably
expected to extend the privileges and immunities afforded under the applicable legal framework. The
integrity of these protections depends fundamentally on the perceived and actual neutrality of the
organization in question.
(iv) Israel has competing international obligations to combat acts of terrorism on its territory:
62. Israel is subject to multiple, and at times competing, international obligations including
its duty to combat acts of terrorism within its territory. These obligations arise not only under
international counter-terrorism conventions but also from binding resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council. In fulfilling these obligations, Israel is required to take effective measures to
prevent, suppress and respond to terrorist activity, even where such measures may intersect with its
responsibilities under other international legal frameworks. Those obligations require it to prevent
any organization, including UNRWA and its staff, from engaging in or facilitating terrorist activities
on its territory. Israel is party to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, alongside 169 other States. Article 15 (a) of the Convention obliges States parties to take
all practicable measures including, where necessary, adapting their domestic legislation to prevent and counter preparations for the commission of offences defined in Article 2, whether within
or outside their territories. These measures include prohibiting illegal activities by individuals,
groups or organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or engage in such
offences.
65. Israel is also bound by a series of binding Security Council resolutions that require all
Member States to take effective measures to combat terrorism and its financing70. Accordingly,
where credible information exists indicating that UNRWA premises and facilities are being used for
terrorist activity; that UNRWA personnel are participating in such activity; or that terrorist
organizations have infiltrated the agency, Israel is not only entitled but obligated under international
counter-terrorism conventions and binding Security Council resolutions to take appropriate action.
This includes the right to prohibit UNRWA’s continued operations within its territory, consistent
with its sovereign duty to prevent and suppress terrorism.
68. Humanitarian organizations operating in occupied or conflict-affected territories must
meet strict criteria of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Where an organization fails to meet
these standards, the occupying Power or party to the conflict retains the right to deny or restrict
access, provided such measures are grounded in legitimate security concerns. This principle applies
not only to occupied territories but also to other areas under a State’s control. Article 70 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions extends this framework to territories under the control of a
party to the conflict “other than occupied territory”, requiring that humanitarian and impartial relief
actions be permitted “without any adverse distinction”.
70. Considering Israel’s credible allegations outlined in this separate opinion, its decision to
restrict UNRWA’s presence and operations on its territory for reasons of national security is clearly
justified under international humanitarian law. This is particularly so, given that Israel continues to
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and essential services to the civilian population through
alternative channels, including capable international organizations and third States. International law
does not impose an obligation on Israel to discharge its humanitarian responsibilities exclusively
through UNRWA. The choice of implementing partners remains within the discretion of the State,
provided humanitarian needs are adequately met.
72. There is no requirement under international law that such assistance be provided through
UNRWA, nor that UNRWA be the exclusive conduit. Israel, along with donor States such as Italy,
has expressed a preference for alternative mechanisms, including the WFP, which are capable of
delivering aid effectively and in accordance with humanitarian principles.
F. Israel’s security concerns that led to its withdrawal
of co-operation with UNRWA
73. Israel’s national security concerns, which prompted its withdrawal of co-operation with
UNRWA, constitute a legitimate basis for its actions under international law. Where credible
allegations exist regarding the infiltration of UNRWA by terrorist organizations, the misuse of its
facilities or the involvement of its personnel in activities that threaten Israel’s sovereignty and
security, the host State is entitled and indeed obligated to take protective measures. Contrary
to the majority views expressed in paragraphs 88 to 101 of the present Advisory Opinion, such
concerns fall squarely within the scope of permissible grounds for restricting the presence and
operations of international organizations on sovereign territory, under Article 59 of the Fourt Geneva
Convention.
74. Israel, as a host State, has since 1967 co-operated with UNRWA in accordance with its
undertakings outlined in the Comay-Michelmore Agreement. However, the Israeli Government has,
over the last two decades, raised security concerns with the United Nations regarding what it sees as
UNRWA’s increasingly irreparable compromise and violation of the fundamental principles of
neutrality, impartiality and independence in the discharge of its humanitarian mandate, including
through infiltration of the organization by members of terrorist groups hostile to Israel, such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Several participants in these proceedings placed significant emphasis on
these security concerns as a justification for Israel’s conduct, arguing that the obligation to co-operate
with the United Nations or its agencies is neither absolute nor unqualified76.
75. In its Written Statement, Israel maintains that UNRWA’s ties to terrorist organizations
have long been documented, but scrutiny intensified following allegations that at least 12 UNRWA
staff members actively participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic
Jihad on Israeli territory. These allegations, supported by Israeli intelligence and later investigated
by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), led to the termination of contracts of nine
staff members whose involvement “could not be ruled out”. In response, several donor States
including the United States, United Kingdom, and others suspended funding to UNRWA.
76. Further claims by Israeli officials suggest that UNRWA facilities, including schools, have
been used by Hamas and Islamic Jihad for storing weapons and launching attacks, raising concerns
about the Agency’s operational neutrality and complicity. Israel has argued that these developments
undermine UNRWA’s legitimacy and justify legislative and operational measures to prohibit its
activities within Israeli territory
77. Examples of security concerns raised by Israel and supported,
amongst others, by the United States of America, include the following:
- In November 2003, Israel submitted a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
alleging that terrorist organizations were exploiting UNRWA facilities in Ramallah, Qalqilya,
Jebalia and other refugee camps as hideouts and places of refuge. According to the letter, this
misuse posed a serious threat to the safety of individuals who genuinely relied on UNRWA’s
humanitarian services. Israel further claimed that violent activities were occurring within
UNRWA-administered camps, in violation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The
letter also accused specific UNRWA staff members of misusing agency documents, vehicles and
facilities to support terrorist organizations. Additionally, Israel expressed concern over
inflammatory rhetoric and politically charged articles published by the UNRWA
Commissioner-General and UNRWA schools, which it viewed not only as being hostile toward
the State of Israel, but as also “undermining the structures established by the United Nations for
the expression of opinions on specific situations” and as “undermin[ing] the Organization’s own
credibility and standing”78.
-On 8 November 2005, Israel reported to the Chairman of the Special Political and Decolonization
Committee (Fourth Committee) that a rocket-propelled grenade was launched on 30 September
2004 from within the premises of the UNRWA Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys
School in Gaza targeting the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)79;
- In June 2017, Israel sent letters to the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council calling upon the United Nations to investigate “the existence of a Hamas-built
tunnel underneath UNRWA-run Maghazi Elementary Boys A & B School and the Maghazi
Preparatory Boys School, in Gaza”, a development Israel asserted was “not an isolated incident”
and evidenced Hama’s military build-up and use of children in military campaigns as “human
shields”. Israel called upon the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chair of the Security
Council to investigate UNRWA’s misinformation campaign against Israel conducted in the OPT
including in its schools80.
- In mid-2017, Israel complained to the United Nations regarding the fact that several UNRWA
personnel were either members of Hamas or had strong connections to Hamas, thereby calling
into question the political neutrality of the agency. Israel specifically noted the example of two
UNRWA staff members, including the Chairman of the UNRWA Staff Union in Gaza, whom it
alleged were elected to the political bureau of Hamas81;
- Israel asserts that in 2023 it found evidence of direct participation by UNRWA staff in the armed
attack and atrocities perpetrated on 7 October of that year, including in abductions, murders and
illegal detention of Israeli citizens, as well as further evidence of systematic infiltration of
UNRWA by Hamas members82.
- In February 2024 Israel provided specific information on the participation of 12 UNRWA staff
members in the attack and atrocities of 7 October 2023 and indicated, based on its intelligence,
that another 30 UNRWA staff assisted or facilitated those crimes. According to Israel, a
comparison of the list of 12,521 UNRWA employees in Gaza during 2023-2024 (provided to
Israel by UNRWA in accordance with procedures established under the 1946 Convention), at least 1,462 of those employees (i.e. 12 per cent) are members of Hamas, its military wing, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad or other factions, groups Israel considers to be terrorist organizations.
Of these persons, 79 per cent are employed as “educators” and 5 per cent as “medical service
providers”. Israel also identified more than 10 per cent of top staff of UNRWA schools and
training centres who were members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Israel’s written submission
includes examples of specific UNRWA staff members whom Israel alleges worked for
Palestinian terrorist groups and participated in the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on the State of
Israel. Israel asserts that it has complained about specific UNRWA employees involved in the
military activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, without an appropriate response from UNRWA.
- Israel further asserts that during the armed hostilities following the 7 October 2023 attack, there
was widespread and systematic misuse of UNRWA assets and facilities, which went largely
unchecked. This, Israel claims, underscores the deeply entrenched ties between Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to Israeli sources, Hamas command-and-control centres,
weapons caches and hideouts were discovered within, or adjacent to, at least 32 UNRWA
facilities including schools, warehouses, compounds and residential buildings. Most notably,
a central server farm located 18 meters underground, allegedly serving as Hamas’ intelligence
command centre, was found beneath UNRWA’s Gaza Headquarters and directly connected to
its electricity supply. Further, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives and infrastructure
were reportedly present inside the UNRWA Headquarters in Gaza City. Multiple attacks against
Israel are said to have been launched from within UNRWA premises.
G. Israel’s security concerns warrant thorough investigation
and resolution by competent authorities
79. In 2021, the European Parliament voiced its disappointment over the content of certain
textbooks and educational materials used in UNRWA schools. It strongly condemned what it
described as “problematic and hateful content that promotes violence, spreads antisemitism, and
incites hatred”, found in Palestinian school textbooks prepared by European Union-funded civil
servants, as well as in supplementary materials developed and taught by UNRWA staff. The
European Union expressed regret that UNRWA had failed to remove these materials from
circulation85.
81. In addition, the United Nations commenced two separate investigations. The first has been
referred to as the “Colonna investigation”, headed by Catherine Colonna, the former French Minister
of Foreign Affairs. This investigation was tasked with assessing “whether UNRWA’s mechanisms
and procedures ensure neutrality”, but not to make any findings regarding the alleged breaches of
neutrality specified by Israel87. The Colonna investigation found that despite the “robust UNRWA
Neutrality Framework established in 2017”, neutrality-related issues persist. They include instances
of staff publicly expressing political views; host-country textbooks with problematic content being
used in some UNRWA schools; and politicized staff unions making threats against UNRWA
management and causing operational disruptions. In particular, it confirmed that UNRWA’s staff
screening mechanisms are inadequate to prevent the employment of terrorists and that periodic
inspections of UNRWA’s installations do not investigate misuse for terrorist purposes.
